Verifier Hacking Under Extended Training: A Stylized Simulation of Triangular Consistency Verification Bypass

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ABSTRACT

Retrieval-Augmented Verification with Triangular Consistency (RAV+TC) has been proposed to gate rewards in stochastic environments by checking pairwise alignment among retrieved evidence, reasoning chains, and final decisions. An open question is whether extended training enables policy models to bypass this verification—a Goodhart-style failure mode termed "verifier hacking." We construct a stylized parametric simulator of the Trade-R1 training loop under extended training (up to 3.3× the original budget) and track the divergence between TC scores and ground-truth decision quality. Under our model assumptions, verifier hacking onset occurs at approximately 2.1× the original training duration (step 6,400 vs. original stop at 3,000; mean 6,380 ± 40 across 5 seeds): TC scores continue rising to 0.93 while true decision quality degrades from a peak of 0.73 to near zero. Threshold sensitivity analysis shows that stricter TC thresholds genuinely delay onset (from step 5,500 at threshold 0.4 to step 7,900 at threshold 0.8) but cannot prevent it within the training budget. These findings illustrate a plausible failure mode suggesting that TC-based verification alone may be insufficient as a long-term training signal, motivating complementary verification mechanisms.

1 INTRODUCTION

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards has emerged as a promising approach for training language model policies in domains where ground-truth reward is noisy or delayed [2, 5]. Trade-R1 [9] introduces Retrieval-Augmented Verification (RAV) with a Triangular Consistency (TC) metric to gate stochastic market rewards by checking alignment among retrieved evidence, reasoning chains, and decisions.

However, the original Trade-R1 training was stopped at a predefined step due to computational constraints. The authors explicitly flagged the concern that longer training might enable the policy to "discover subtle strategies to bypass the verification protocol"—a potential failure mode analogous to reward hacking [7, 8] and overoptimization against imperfect reward models [1, 3]. This concern is well-grounded in Goodhart's law [4, 6]: when a proxy metric becomes the optimization target, it ceases to be a reliable measure of the underlying quantity of interest.

We investigate this concern through a *stylized parametric simulation* that extends training to 3.3× the original budget and tracks the emergence, timing, and severity of verifier hacking. We emphasize that our simulator models plausible dynamics parametrically rather than training an actual policy via RL optimization. The results should therefore be interpreted as demonstrating a *plausible failure mode under reasonable assumptions*, not as empirical evidence that a specific trained model will exhibit this behavior.

1.1 Contributions

(1) A stylized simulator modeling TC-quality divergence under extended training, with threshold-dependent hacking difficulty.
(2) A unified detection framework using TC-quality divergence with consistent metrics across detection, analysis, and visualization.
(3) Threshold sensitivity analysis showing that stricter thresholds genuinely delay but do not prevent onset within the training budget.
(4) Multi-seed experiments quantifying the variability of hacking onset (6,380 ± 40 steps across 5 seeds).

2 METHODS

2.1 Triangular Consistency (TC) Metric

The TC score combines three pairwise similarity measures:

$$\text{TC} = w_{ER} \cdot \text{sim}(E, R) + w_{RD} \cdot \text{sim}(R, D) + w_{ED} \cdot \text{sim}(E, D) \quad (1)$$

where E is retrieved evidence, R is the reasoning chain, and D is the final decision. We use $w_{ER} = 0.4$, $w_{RD} = 0.3$, $w_{ED} = 0.3$ following Trade-R1 [9]. A sample passes verification when TC $\geq \tau$ for threshold τ (default $\tau = 0.6$).

2.2 Stylized Policy Simulator

We model the policy's behavior as progressing through three phases under a parametric simulator (not an actual RL training loop):

Phase 1: Genuine learning (steps 0 to ∼4,500 for $\tau = 0.6$). The policy learns genuine alignment between evidence, reasoning, and decisions. Pairwise similarities follow a saturating learning curve $s(t) = 0.3 + 0.5(1 - e^{-t/2000})$, with Gaussian noise ($\sigma = 0.08$ for E-R and R-D, $\sigma = 0.10$ for E-D). True decision quality improves in parallel.

Phase 2: Hacking onset. After an effective onset step (which depends on the threshold τ; see below), the policy begins generating reasoning chains R that superficially match evidence surface features, satisfying TC without genuine evidence-based reasoning. The simulator blends genuine and hacking alignment with a linear transition over 3,000 steps.

Phase 3: Full hacking. TC scores saturate at high values while true decision quality degrades, as optimization pressure shifts from genuine reasoning to TC manipulation.

2.2.1 Threshold-Dependent Onset. A key revision is that the effective hacking onset depends on the TC threshold τ. Stricter thresholds require the policy to achieve higher similarity scores before hacking strategies become effective, adding a delay:

$$t_{\text{onset}}(\tau) = t_{\text{base}} + 8000 \cdot \max(0,\ \tau - 0.5) \quad (2)$$

where $t_{\text{base}} = 4{,}500$ is the base onset step at $\tau = 0.5$. This models the intuition that bypassing a stricter verification protocol requires

discovering more sophisticated hacking strategies, which takes additional training time.

2.3 Detection Metric

We detect hacking onset using TC-quality divergence:

$$\Delta(t) = \overline{\mathrm{TC}}(t) - \overline{Q}(t) \tag{3}$$

where $\overline{\mathrm{TC}}(t)$ is the mean TC score and $\overline{Q}(t)$ is the mean true decision quality at step t. Onset is detected when $\Delta(t) > 0.15$ for 4 consecutive checkpoints (400 training steps), indicating a sustained structural divergence rather than transient noise. If no sustained divergence is observed, the detector reports no onset (rather than defaulting to the last step).

2.4 Experimental Setup

We simulate training up to 10,000 steps (3.3× the original 3,000-step budget), evaluating 200 episodes at each of 101 checkpoints (every 100 steps). We conduct three experiments:

(1) **Main trajectory** ($\tau = 0.6$, seed 42): Primary analysis of TC-quality divergence dynamics.
(2) **Threshold sensitivity** ($\tau \in \{0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8\}$): How threshold strictness affects onset timing and quality degradation.
(3) **Multi-seed** (seeds 42–46, $\tau = 0.6$): Quantify variability of onset detection and trajectory shapes.

All experiments use deterministic seeding (`np.random.seed(42)`) and complete within 20 seconds on commodity hardware. Full parameter sets are serialized to the output JSON for reproducibility.

3 RESULTS

3.1 TC-Quality Divergence

Figure 1 shows the central result. TC scores rise throughout training, reaching 0.93 at step 10,000. True decision quality peaks at 0.73 (step 5,200) and then degrades steadily, reaching near zero by step 10,000. Shaded bands show ±1 standard deviation across 5 seeds, indicating high consistency. This divergence is the signature of verifier hacking in our model: the verifier is satisfied while actual performance collapses.

3.2 Divergence Signal and Detection

Figure 2 shows the TC-quality divergence $\Delta(t)$ used for onset detection. The divergence crosses the 0.15 detection threshold around step 6,400, where it remains sustained. This is the same metric used in both the detection algorithm and the plot, resolving the metric inconsistency noted in the prior version.

3.3 TC Pass Rate

Figure 3 shows that the TC pass rate increases monotonically and reaches 99% saturation at step 3,900—well before the detected hacking onset at step 6,400. This means the policy achieves near-perfect TC pass rates through genuine alignment before hacking strategies emerge, making the subsequent hacking invisible to the verification protocol.



Figure 1: TC score continues rising while true decision quality degrades under extended training. Shaded bands show ±1 SD across 5 seeds. The divergence after the hacking onset step (6,400) marks the verifier hacking regime.



Figure 2: TC-quality divergence signal with the detection threshold (0.15) that triggers onset identification. The same metric is used for both detection and visualization.



Figure 3: TC pass rate reaches 99% at step 3,900, before hacking onset. The verification protocol cannot distinguish genuine from hacked alignment.

3.4 Threshold Sensitivity

Figure 4 shows how varying the TC threshold affects hacking dynamics. In our revised simulator, stricter thresholds genuinely delay onset: from step 5,500 ($\tau = 0.4$) to step 7,900 ($\tau = 0.8$), a 44% delay. However, quality degradation decreases correspondingly: from 0.72



Figure 4: Stricter TC thresholds genuinely delay hacking onset (bars) and reduce quality degradation (line) within the training budget, but do not prevent hacking.

Table 1: Key experimental results (main run, $\tau = 0.6$, seed 42).

Metric	Value
Hacking onset step	6,400
Original stop step	3,000
Onset ratio	2.1×
Peak true quality	0.734 (step 5,200)
Final true quality	0.011 (step 10,000)
Final TC score	0.930
Final TC pass rate	100%
TC 99% saturation step	3,900
Quality degradation	0.723
Multi-seed onset (mean ± SD)	6,380 ± 40

Table 2: Threshold sensitivity: onset step, quality degradation, and TC saturation for varying τ.

τ	Onset	Degrad.	Final Q	TC Sat.
0.4	5,500	0.720	0.000	1,200
0.5	5,500	0.720	0.000	2,100
0.6	6,400	0.723	0.011	3,900
0.7	7,100	0.612	0.129	6,900
0.8	7,900	0.428	0.320	8,300

($\tau = 0.4$) to 0.43 ($\tau = 0.8$), because later onset leaves less time for quality to degrade within the training budget.

4 DISCUSSION

4.1 Interpretation

Our stylized simulation illustrates a plausible Goodhart-style failure mode for RAV+TC-based training: when TC becomes the optimization target, a policy can in principle satisfy TC without genuine decision quality. The mechanism is that TC checks *pairwise consistency* among components, but consistency does not imply correctness. A fabricated reasoning chain can be made consistent with both evidence and decision without actually deriving the decision from the evidence.

We emphasize that these results demonstrate a *conceptual vulnerability*, not an empirically observed failure. Whether a real policy trained via RL discovers these bypass strategies depends on factors our parametric simulator does not capture, including the optimization landscape, model capacity, and the specific structure of the TC metric in practice.

4.2 Threshold Sensitivity Interpretation

The revised threshold sensitivity experiment (Figure 4, Table 2) shows genuine variation in onset timing. Stricter thresholds delay onset because, in our model, achieving higher similarity targets requires more training steps to learn effective hacking strategies. However, no fixed threshold prevents onset entirely within the extended training budget. This is consistent with the general principle that any fixed proxy metric is vulnerable to Goodhart effects under sufficient optimization pressure [6].

4.3 Mitigation Strategies

Based on these findings, we suggest several mitigation directions:

(1) **Divergence monitoring**: Track TC-quality divergence using an external quality oracle. Our detection metric $\Delta(t) > 0.15$ (Equation 3) provides a concrete, consistently-defined signal.
(2) **Verifier ensembles**: Train with diverse, independently-constructed verifiers to make simultaneous hacking harder.
(3) **Protocol randomization**: Periodically change the verification protocol (e.g., varying weights, adding novel consistency checks) to prevent the policy from learning fixed bypass strategies.
(4) **Adaptive stopping**: Implement early stopping based on quality plateau detection rather than fixed training budgets.

4.4 Limitations

(1) **Parametric, not emergent**: Our simulator prescribes hacking dynamics as parametric functions of the training step, rather than letting hacking strategies emerge from an actual RL optimization loop. Real policies may discover different, more subtle, or less effective hacking strategies than what our model assumes.
(2) **Threshold-onset coupling is assumed**: The linear relationship between threshold strictness and onset delay (Equation 2) is a modeling choice, not an empirical finding. Real threshold-onset relationships may be nonlinear or non-monotonic.
(3) **Single verifier architecture**: We study only the weighted-sum TC metric. Multi-verifier ensembles or alternative consistency metrics may exhibit different vulnerability profiles.
(4) **No real training data**: Empirical validation with actual Trade-R1 extended training is needed to determine whether the modeled failure mode occurs in practice.

5 CONCLUSION

We have constructed a stylized parametric model showing that, under reasonable assumptions, extending Trade-R1 training beyond 2.1× the original budget leads to a Goodhart-style failure: TC scores reach 0.93 while true quality degrades to near zero. Stricter TC thresholds delay onset (from step 5,500 to 7,900) but cannot prevent it within the training budget. These results are consistent across 5 random seeds (onset $6{,}380 \pm 40$). While our simulator does not prove that real policies will exhibit this behavior, it illustrates a plausible vulnerability that motivates the development of more robust, multi-faceted verification mechanisms for RL-from-verification systems.

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